Memory and Consciousness
Marcel Kinsbourne
New School University
New York, USA
Prerequisites: None
Course Description:
Contextual constraints on re-experiencing
When consciously recollecting, the individual mentally in part recreates
a past event or episode. If episodic memory is time travel, it is the memory
that travels, and not the person who remembers. This is because remembering
is a conscious state in the present. Consequently it is subject to constraints
that reflect the present context and recent experience. These constraints
account for systematic biases in remembering, which we will explore in relation
to a field theory of consciousness.
Model of consciousness
Rejecting a modular alternative view, I shall present consciousness as the
subjective aspect of the current configuration of the cerebral activation
manifold. The forebrain’s activation peaks of the moment represent what is
most salient or focal in attention. During conscious remembering, the
recreated experience preempts cerebral space. This model rationalizes the
effect of context (ground) on what is remembered (figure). Memories of an
event at different times can be considered as multiple drafts of the same
experience.
Estimation of time passing
It is possible to remember not only what happened in the past, but also the
amount of time passing. We will discuss discontinuity between short term
(specious present) and long-term estimations, and the implications for mechanism
of their differential vulnerability to frontal and sub-cortical injury.
Experiences prolonged into the past
“Eidetic memories”, both constitutional and precipitated by brain damage,
constitute experiences that persist beyond the present, or recur as if being
re-experienced.
Biased memories
Conscious remembering is impaired and biased to the extent that conditions
at encoding and retrieval are not congruous. An extreme example is infant
memory and specifically infantile amnesia. Where false, “recovered” memories
are also cases in point. Group influences are apt to bias what is recollected.
Internally constructed memories
Memories of previously experienced events contribute to constructed experiences
that are hallucinated, confabulated and dreamt.
Animal remembering
We will consider how one might determine whether some animals are capable
of conscious recollection.
Reading List
Luria, A.R. (1968) The Mind of a Mnemonist. London: Jonathan
Cape.
.
Stickgold, R., Hobson, J.A, Fosse, R. and Fosse, M. (2002) Sleep, learning
and dreams: Off-line memory reprocessing. Science, 294, 1052-1057.
Tulving, E. (1985) Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology, 26, 1-12.
Tulving, E. and Craik, F.M. (2000) The Oxford Handbook of Memory. Oxford:
Oxford University Press. (Particularly Chapters 17 (Rovee-Collier and Hayne),
18 (Nelson and Fivush), 19 (Perner), 24 (Schooler and Eich), 37 (Wheeler),
and 38 (Moscovitch).
Relevant Personal Articles.
Kinsbourne, M. and Wood, F. (1975) Short-term memory processes and the amnesic
syndrome. In J.A. Deutsch (Ed.), Short-Term Memory (pp. 257-291). New York:
Academic Press.
Hicks, R.E., Miller, G.W. and Kinsbourne, M. (1976) Prospective and retrospective
judgments of time as a function of amount of information processed. American
Journal of Psychology, 89, 719-730.
Kinsbourne, M. (1988) Integrated cortical field model of consciousness. In
A.J. Marcel and E. Bisiach (Eds.), The Concept of Consciousness in Contemporary
Science. London: Oxford University Press.
Kinsbourne, M. (1989) The boundaries of episodic remembering: A commentary.
In F.I.M. Craik and H.L. Roediger (Eds.), Varieties of Memory and Consciousness:
Essays in Honour of Endel Tulving (pp. 179-191). Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum.
Kinsbourne, M. and Hicks, R.E. (1990). The extended present: Evidence from
time estimation by amnesics and normals. In G. Vallar and T. Shallice (Eds.),
Neuropsychological Impairments of Short-Term Memory (pp. 319-330). London:
Cambridge University Press.
Dennett, D. and Kinsbourne, M. (1992) Time and the observer: The where and
when of consciousness in the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 15, 183-247.
Kinsbourne, M. (1996) What qualifies a representation for a role in consciousness?
In J.D. Cohen and J.W. Schooler (Eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness
(pp. 335-356). Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum.
Kinsbourne, M. (1998) Representations in consciousness and the neuropsychology
of insight. In X.F. Amador and A. David (Eds.), Insight and Psychosis (pp.
174-192). Cambridge, MA: Oxford University Press.
Kinsbourne, M. (2000) The role of memory in estimating time: A neuropsychological
analysis. In L.T. Connor and L.K. Obler (Eds.), Neurobehavior of Language
and Cognition: Studies of Normal Aging and Brain Damage, pp. 315-327. Dordrecht,
Netherlands: Kluwer.
Kinsbourne, M. (2000) Consciousness in action: Antecedents and origins. Mind
and Language, 15, 545-555.
Kinsbourne, M. (2000) The mechanism of confabulation. Neuropsychoanalysis,
2, 158-166.